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WHITE SUPERIORITY IN AMERICA: ITS LEGAL LEGACY,
ITS ECONOMIC COSTS
DERRICK BELL*
A FEW years ago, I was presenting a lecture in which I enu-
merated the myriad ways in which black people have been
used to enrich this society and made to serve as its proverbial
scapegoat. I was particularly bitter about the country's practice of
accepting black contributions and ignoring the contributors. In-
deed, I suggested, had black people not existed, America would
have invented them.
From the audience, a listener reflecting more insight on my
subject than I had shown, shouted out, "Hell man, they did invent
us." The audience immediately understood and responded to the
comment with a round of applause in which I joined. Whether we
are called "colored," "Negroes," "Afro-Americans," or "blacks,"
we are marked with the caste of color in a society still determi-
nately white. As a consequence, we are shaped, molded, changed,
from what we might have been . . . into what we are. Much of
what we are-considering the motivations for our "invention," is
miraculous. And much of that invention-as you might expect-
is far from praiseworthy . . . scarred as it is by all the marks of
oppression.
Not the least of my listener's accomplishments was the seem-
ing answer to the question that is the title of this talk. And in-
deed, racial discrimination has wrought and continues to place a
heavy burden on all black people in this country. A major func-
tion of racial discrimination is to facilitate the exploitation of
black labor, to deny us access to benefits and opportunities that
would otherwise be available, and to blame all the manifestations
of exclusion-bred despair on the asserted inferiority of the
victims.
But the costs and cost-benefits of racial discrimination are
not so neatly summarized. There are two other inter-connected
political phenomena that emanate from the widely shared belief
that whites are superior to blacks, that have served critically im-
* Professor of Law, Harvard University. This article was the basis of the
Donald A. Giannella Memorial Lecture at the Villanova University School of
Law, April 18, 1988.
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portant stabilizing functions in the society. First, whites of widely
varying socio-economic status employ white supremacy as a cata-
lyst to negotiate policy differences, often through compromises
that sacrifice the rights of blacks.
Second, even those whites who lack wealth and power are
sustained in their sense of racial superiority and thus rendered
more willing to accept their lesser share, by an unspoken but no
less certain property right in their "whiteness." This right is rec-
ognized and upheld by courts and the society like all property
rights under a government created and sustained primarily for
that purpose.
Let us look first at the compromise-catalyst role of racism in
American policy-making. When the Constitution's Framers gath-
ered in Philadelphia, it is clear that their compromises on slavery
were the key that enabled Southerners and Northerners to work
out their economic and political differences.
The slavery compromises set a precedent under which black
rights have been sacrificed throughout the nation's history to fur-
ther white interests. Those compromises are far more than an
embarrassing blot on our national history. Rather, they are the
original and still definitive examples of the on-going struggle be-
tween individual rights reform and the maintenance of the socio-
economic status quo.
Why did the Framers do it? Surely, there is little substance in
the traditional rationalizations that the slavery provisions in the
Constitution were merely unfortunate concessions pressured by
the crisis of events and influenced by then prevailing beliefs that:
(1) slavery was on the decline and would soon die of its own
weight; or that (2) Africans were thought a different and inferior
breed of beings and their enslavement carried no moral onus.
The insistence of southern delegates on protection of their
slave property was far too vigorous to suggest that the institution
would soon be abandoned.' And the anti-slavery statements by
slaves and white abolitionists alike were too forceful to suggest
that the slavery compromises were the product of men who did
not know the moral ramifications of what they did.2
1. Even on the unpopular subject of importing slaves, Southern delegates
were adamant. John Rutledge from South Carolina warned: "If the Convention
thinks that N.C.; S.C. & Georgia will ever agree to the plan, unless their right to
import slaves be untouched, the expectation is vain. The people of those States
will never be such fools as to give up so important an interest." II THE RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONvENTION or 1787, at 373 (M. Farrand ed. 1911).
2. The debate over the morality of slavery had raged for years with influen-
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The question of what motivated the Framers remains. My re-
cent book, And We Are Not Saved,3 contains several allegorical sto-
ries intended to explore various aspects of American racism using
the tools of fiction. In one of these stories, or chronicles, the
book's heroine, Geneva Crenshaw, a black civil rights lawyer,
gifted with extraordinary powers, is transported back to the Con-
stitutional Convention of 1787.
There is, I know, no mention of this visit in Max Farrand's
records of the Convention proceedings. James Madison's com-
pulsive notes are silent on the event. But the omission of the de-
bate that followed her sudden appearance in the locked meeting
room, and the protection she is provided when the delegates try
to eject her is easier to explain than the still embarrassing fact
that these men-some of the outstanding figures of their time-
could incorporate slavery into a document committed to life, lib-
erty, and the pursuit of happiness to all.
Would they have acted differently had they known the great
grief their compromises on slavery would cause? Geneva's mis-
sion is to use her knowledge of the next two centuries to convince
the Framers that. they should not incorporate recognition and
protection of slavery in the document they are writing. To put it
mildly, her sudden arrival at the podium was sufficiently startling
to intimidate even these men. But outrage quickly overcame their
shock. Ignoring Geneva's warm greeting and her announcement
that she had come from 200 years in the future, some of the more
vigorous delegates, outraged at the sudden appearance in their
midst of a woman, and a black woman at that, charged towards
her. As Geneva described the scene:
Suddenly, the hall was filled with the sound of martial
music, blasting trumpets, and a deafening roll of snare
drums. At the same time-and as the delegates were al-
most upon me-a cylinder composed of thin vertical
bars of red, white, and blue light descended swiftly and
silently from the high ceiling, nicely encapsulating the
podium and me.
tial Americans denouncing slavery as a corrupt and morally unjustifiable prac-
tice. See, e.g., W. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
AMERICA: 1760-1848, at 42-43 (1977). And slaves themselves petitioned gov-
ernmental officials and legislatures to abolish slavery. See I A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 5-12 (H. Aptheker ed.
1968).
3. D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIALJUS-
TICE (1987).
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To their credit, the self-appointed eviction party
neither slowed nor swerved. As each man reached and
tried to pass through the transparent light shield, there
was a loud hiss, quite like the sound electrified bug zap-
pers make on a warm, summer evening. While not le-
thal, the shock the shield dealt each attacker was
sufficiently strong to literally knock him to the floor,
stunned and shaking.
This phenomenon evokes chaos rather than attention in the
room, but finally during a lull in the bedlam, Geneva tries for the
third time to be heard. "Gentlemen," she begins again, "Dele-
gates,"-then paused and, with a slight smile, added, "fellow citi-
zens. I have come to urge that, in your great work here, you not
restrict to white men of property the sweep of Thomas Jefferson's
self-evident truths. For all men (and women too) are equal and
endowed by the Creator with inalienable rights, including 'Life,
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.' "
The debate that ensues between Geneva and the Framers is
vigorous, but despite the extraordinary powers at her disposal,
Geneva is unable to alter the already reached compromises on
slavery. She tries to embarrass the Framers by pointing out the
contradiction in their commitment to freedom and liberty and
their embrace of slavery. They will not buy it:
"There is no contradiction," replied a delegate.
"Governeur Morris of Pennsylvania . . . has admitted
that 'Life and liberty were generally said to be of more
value, than property .... [but] an accurate view of the
matter would nevertheless prove that property is the
main object of Society.' "'4
"A contradiction," another added, "would occur
were we to follow the course you urge. We are not una-
ware of the moral issues raised by slavery, but we have
no response to the [Southern delegate] who has admon-
ished us that 'property in slaves should not be exposed
to danger under a Government instituted for the protec-
tion of property.' "5
Government, was instituted principally for the pro-
tection of property and was itself ... supported by prop-
4. See generally I THE RECORD OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 533
(M. Farrand ed. 1911).
5. Id. at 593-94.
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erty. Property is the great object of government; the
great cause of war; the great means of carrying it on.6
The security the Southerners seek is that their Negroes
may not be taken from them. After all, Negroes are their
wealth, their only resource.
Where, Geneva wondered, were those delegates from north-
ern states, many of whom abhorred slavery and had already spo-
ken out against it in the Convention? She found her answer in the
castigation she received from one of the Framers who told her:
Woman, we would have you gone from this place.
But if a record be made, that record should show that
the economic benefits of slavery do not accrue only to
the South. Plantation states provide a market for North-
ern factories, and the New England shipping industry
and merchants participate in the slave trade. Northern
states, moreover, utilize slaves in the fields, as domestics,
and even as soldiers to defend against Indian raids.
Slavery has provided the wealth that made indepen-
dence possible, another delegate told her. The profits
from slavery funded the Revolution. It cannot be de-
nied. At the time of the Revolution, the goods for which
the United States demanded freedom were produced in
very large measure by slave labor. Desperately needing
assistance from other countries, we purchased this aid
from France with tobacco produced mainly by slave la-
bor. The nation's economic well-being depended on the
institution, and its preservation is essential if the Consti-
tution we are drafting is to be more than a useless docu-
ment. At least, that is how we view the crisis we face.
At the most dramatic moment of the debate, a somber dele-
gate got to his feet, and walked fearlessly right up to the shimmer-
ing light shield. Then he spoke seriously and with obvious
anxiety:
This contradiction is not lost on us. Surely we
know, even though we are at pains not to mention it, that
we have sacrificed the freedom of your people in the be-
lief that this involuntary forfeiture is necessary to secure
the property interests of whites in a society espousing, as
6. Id. at 542.
1988]
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its basic principle, the liberty of all. Perhaps we, with the
responsibility of forming a radically new government in
perilous times, see more clearly than is possible for you
in hindsight that the unavoidable cost of our labors will
be the need to accept and live with what you call a
contradiction.
Realizing that she was losing the debate, Geneva intensified
her efforts. But the imprisoned delegates' signals for help had
been seen and the local militia summoned. Hearing some com-
motion beyond the window, she turned to see a small cannon be-
ing rolled up, and aimed at her. Then, in quick succession, a
militiaman lighted the fuse; the delegates dived under their desks;
the cannon fired; and, with an ear-splitting roar, the cannonball
broke against the light shield and splintered, leaving the shield
intact, but terminating both the visit and all memory of it.
The Framers felt-and likely they were right-that a govern-
ment committed to the protection of property could not have
come into being with the race-based, slavery compromises placed
in the Constitution. It is surely so that the economic benefits of
slavery and the political compromises of black rights played a very
major role in the nation's growth and development. In short,
without slavery, there would be no Constitution to celebrate.
This is true not only because slavery provided the wealth that
made independence possible, but also because it afforded an ide-
ological basis to resolve conflict between propertied and un-
propertied whites.
According to historians, including Edmund Morgan 7 and
David Brion Davis,8 working class whites did not oppose slavery
when it took root in the mid-1660s. They identified on the basis
of race with wealthy planters . . . even though they were and
would remain economically subordinate to those able to afford
slaves. But the creation of a black subclass enabled poor whites
to identify with and support the policies of the upper-class. And
large landowners, with the safe economic advantage provided by
their slaves, were willing to grant poor whites a larger role in the
political process. 9 Thus, paradoxically, slavery for blacks led to
greater freedom for poor whites, at least when compared with the
7. E. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE ORDEAL OF
COLONIAL VIRGINIA (1975).
8. D. DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION: 1770-
1820 (1975).
9. E. MORGAN, supra note 7, at 380-81.
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denial of freedom to African slaves. Slavery also provided mainly
propertyless whites with a property in their whiteness.
My point is that the slavery compromises continued, rather
than set a precedent under which black rights have been sacrificed
throughout the nation's history to further white interests. Con-
sider only a few examples:
-The long fight for universal male suffrage was successful in
several states when opponents and advocates alike, reached com-
promises based on their generally held view that blacks should
not vote. Historian Leon Litwack reports that "utilizing various
political, social, economic, and pseudo-anthropological argu-
ments, white suffragists moved to deny the vote to the Negro.
From the admission of Maine in 1819 until the end of the Civil
War, every new state restricted the suffrage to whites in its
constitution." '0
-By 1857, the nation's economic development had stretched
the initial slavery compromises to the breaking point. The differ-
ences between planters and business interests that had been
papered over 70 years earlier by greater mutual dangers, could
not be settled by a further sacrifice of black rights in the Dred Scott
case. '
Chief Justice Taney's conclusion in Dred Scott that blacks had
no rights whites were bound to respect, represented a renewed
effort to compromise political differences between whites by sac-
rificing the rights of blacks. The effort failed, less because Taney
was willing to place all blacks-free as well as slave-outside the
ambit of constitutional protection, than because he rashly com-
mitted the Supreme Court to one side of the fiercely contested
issues of economic and political power that were propelling the
nation toward the Civil War.
When the Civil War ended, the North pushed through consti-
tutional amendments, nominally to grant citizenship rights to for-
mer slaves, but actually to protect its victory. But within a decade,
when another political crisis threatened a new civil war, black
rights were again sacrificed in the Hayes-Tilden Compromise of
1877. Constitutional jurisprudence fell in line with Taney's con-
clusion regarding the rights of blacks vis a vis whites even as his
opinion was condemned. The country moved ahead, but blacks
10. L. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES 1790-
1860, at 79 (1967).
11. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
19881 773
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were cast into a status that only looked positive when compared
with slavery itself.
This audience could add several more examples, but I hope
these suffice to make my first point: that throughout our history,
whites of widely varying socio-economic status, have employed
deeply set beliefs in white supremacy as a catalyst to negotiate
and resolve policy differences, often through compromises that
sacrifice the rights of blacks.
My second and connected point is that even those whites who
lack wealth and power are sustained in their sense of racial superi-
ority and thus rendered more willing to accept their lesser share,
by an unspoken but no less certain property right in their "white-
ness." This right is recognized and upheld by courts and the soci-
ety like all property rights under a government created and
sustained primarily for that purpose.
In the post-Reconstruction era, the constitutional amend-
ments initially promoted to provide rights for the newly emanci-
pated blacks were transformed into the major legal bulwarks for
corporate growth. The legal philosophy of that era espoused lib-
erty of action untrammelled by state authority, but the only logic
of the ideology-and its goal-was the exploitation of the work-
ing class, whites as well as blacks.
As to whites, consider Lochner v. New York,' 2 where the Court
refused to find that the state's police powers extended to protect-
ing bakery employees against employers who required them to
work in physically unhealthy conditions for more than 10 hours
per day and 60 hours per week. Such maximum hour legislation,
the Court held, would interfere with the bakers' inherent freedom
to make their own contracts with the employers on the best terms
they could negotiate. In effect, the Court simply assumed in that
pre-union era that employees and employers bargained from po-
sitions of equal strength. Liberty of that sort simply legitimated
the sweat shops in which men, women, and children, were quite
literally worked to death.
For blacks, of course, we can compare Lochner with the deci-
sion in Plessy v. Ferguson,13 decided only eight years earlier. In
Plessy, the Court upheld the state's police power to segregate
12. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (overruled by Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726,
730 (1963) ("[D]octrine that ... due process authorizes courts to hold laws
unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely [is] ...
discarded.")).
13. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954)("separate but equal" doctrine inapplicable to public education)).
[Vol. 33: p. 767
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blacks in public facilities even though such segregation must, of
necessity, interfere with the liberties of facilities' owners to use
their property as they saw fit.
Both opinions are quite similar in the Court's use of four-
teenth amendment fictions: the assumed economic "liberty" of
bakers in Lochner, and the assumed political "equality" of blacks in
Plessy. Those assumptions, of course, required the most blatant
form of hypocrisy. Both decisions, though, protected existing
property and political arrangements, while ignoring the disadvan-
tages to the powerless caught in those relationships: the ex-
ploited whites (in Lochner) and the segregated blacks (in Plessy).
The effort to form workers' unions to combat the ever-more
powerful corporate structure was undermined because of the ac-
tive antipathy against blacks practiced by all but a few unions. 14
Excluded from jobs and the unions because of their color, blacks
were hired as scab labor during strikes, a fact that simply in-
creased the hostility of white workers that should have been di-
rected toward their corporate oppressors.
The Populist Movement in the latter part of the nineteenth
century attempted to build a working-class party in the South
strong enough to overcome the economic exploitation by the rul-
ing classes. But when neither Populists nor the conservative
Democrats were able to control the black vote, they agreed to ex-
clude blacks entirely through state constitutional amendments,
thereby leaving whites to fight out elections themselves. With
blacks no longer a force at the ballot box, conservatives dropped
even the semblance of opposition to "Jim Crow" provisions
pushed by lower-class whites as their guarantee that the nation
recognized their priority citizenship claim, based on their
whiteness.
Southern whites rebelled against the Supreme Court's 1954
decision declaring school segregation unconstitutional precisely
because they felt the long-standing priority of their superior sta-
tus to blacks had been unjustly repealed. This year, we celebrate
the thirty-fourth anniversary of the Court's rejection of the "sepa-
rate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson,15 but in the late
twentieth century, the passwords for gaining judicial recognition
of the still viable property right in being white include "higher
14. See, e.g., W. GOULD, BLACK WORKERS IN WHITE UNIONS: JOB DISCRIMI-
NATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1977); H. HILL, BLACK LABOR AND THE AMERICAN
LEGAL SYSTEM (1977).
15. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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entrance scores, "16 "seniority," ' 7 and "neighborhood schools."',,
There is as well, the use of impossible to hurdle intent barriers, to
deny blacks remedies for racial injustices where the relief sought
would either undermine white expectations and advantages
gained during years of overt discrimination, 19 or where such relief
would expose the deeply imbedded racism in a major institution,
such as the criminal justice system. 20
The continuing resistance to affirmative action plans, set-
asides, and other meaningful relief for discrimination-caused
harm, is based in substantial part on the perception that black
gains threaten the main component of status for many whites: the
sense that as whites, they are entitled to priority and preference
over blacks. The law has mostly encouraged and upheld what Mr.
Plessy argued in Plessy v. Ferguson was a property right in white-
ness, and those at the top of the society have been benefitted be-
cause the masses of whites are too occupied in keeping blacks
down to note the large gap between their shaky status and that of
whites on top.
Blacks continue to serve the role of buffers between those
most advantaged in the society, and those whites seemingly con-
tent to live the lives of the rich and famous through the pages of
the tabloids and television dramas, like Dallas, Falcon Crest and
Dynasty. Caught in the vortex of this national conspiracy that is
perhaps more effective because it apparently functions without
master plans or even conscious thought, the wonder is, not that
so many blacks manifest self-destructive or non-functional behav-
ior patterns, but that there are so many who continue to strive
and sometimes succeed, despite all.
The cost to black people of racial discrimination is high, but
beyond the bitterness that blacks understandably feel, there is the
reality that most whites too, are, as Jesse Jackson puts it, victims
of economic injustice. Indeed, allocating the costs is not a worth-
while use of energy when the need now is so clearly a cure.
There are today-even in the midst of outbreaks of anti-black
hostility on our campuses and elsewhere-some indications that
an increasing number of working class whites are learning what
blacks have long known: that the rhetoric of freedom so freely
16. Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
17. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
18. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
19. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
20. McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987).
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voiced in this country is no substitute for the economic justice
that has been so long denied.
True, it may be that the structure of capitalism, supported as
was the Framers' intention by the constitution, will never give suf-
ficiently to provide real economic justice for all. But in the begin-
ning, that constitution deemed those who were black as the fit
subject of property. The miracle of that document-too little
noted during its bicentennial-is that those same blacks and their
allies have in their quest for racial justice brought to the Constitu-
tion much of its current protection of individual rights.
The challenge is to move the document's protection into the
sacrosanct area of economic right this time to insure that oppor-
tunity in this sphere is available to all. Progress in this critical
area will require continued civil rights efforts, but may depend to
a large extent on whites coming to recognize that their property
right in being white has been purchased for too much and has
netted them only the opportunity, as C. Vann Woodward put it,
"to hoard sufficient racism in their bosoms to feel superior to
blacks while working at a black's wages."
In this regard, I hope you realize that we are witnessing a
historic event as Rev. Jesse Jackson attempts to convince whites of
the truth that blacks have long known: that the rhetoric of liberty
so freely offered is no substitute for the economic justice that has
been so long denied.
True, it may be that the structure of capitalism, supported as
was the Framers' intention by the Constitution, will never give
sufficiently to provide real economic justice for all. There is more
than ample reason to question with Tilden J. LeMelle:
Whether a society in which racism has been internalized
and institutionalized to the point of being an essential
and inherently functioning component of that society-a
culture from whose inception racial discrimination has
been a regulative force for maintaining stability and
growth and for maximizing other cultural values-
whether such a society of itself can even legislate (let
alone enforce) public policy to combat racial discrimina-
tion is most doubtful. 2 1
"A racist culture," LeMelle fears, "can move to eradicate or
make racism ineffective only when racism itself becomes a serious
21. T. LeMelle, Forward to R. BERKY, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND PUBLIC
POLICY IN UNITED STATES 38 (1971).
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threat to the culture and its bearers." 22 In this regard, the cur-
rent presidential campaign is both a hope and a discouragement.
It is a hope because a surprisingly substantial group of whites-
including working class whites-have evidenced an ability to over-
come the fatal attraction of the etherial property right in white-
ness, and are recognizing the need to rally with blacks-and a
black candidate-for economic protection against exploiters who
are mainly white.
The discouragement is that so many leaders of the party sup-
posedly committed to social welfare and economic justice for the
working classes are so willing to stop at all costs a candidate with
the proven potential to unite blacks and whites across the race-as-
property colorline. It is said that a black man-and particularly
this black man-cannot be elected.
This prediction, voiced by experts, and trumpeted by the me-
dia, is accepted as gospel by the powers in the party whose
strongly supported candidate in 1984 lost in 49 states. The Dem-
ocratic party powers are so convinced that American intolerance
will bar the election of a black that they are ready to embrace and
deem electable America's first ethnic President whose wife is a
Jew, and whose economic miracle in Massachusetts will prove-
under close scrutiny-to be more the result of good fortune than
good government.
I hope you do not miss the paradox of a people who have
been the historic victims of American racism, and their candi-
dates, who evidence more faith in the ability of white people to
overcome their racism than do the leaders of the party that blacks
have supported unstintingly for more than half a century. I do
not hope to change the minds of those who oppose Jesse Jackson.
He, like the other candidates, has weaknesses as well as strengths.
I do urge that you place in context my message regarding the
need, by whites as well as blacks, for decolonization of racial-
mindsets.
The cost of racial discrimination is levied against us all.
Blacks feel the burden and strive to remove it. Too many whites
have felt that it was in their interest to resist those freedom ef-
forts. Those pulls, despite the counter-indicators provided by
history, logic and simple common sense, remain strong. But the
efforts to achieve racial justice have already performed a miracle
of transforming the Constitution-a document primarily intended
22. Id.
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to protect property rights-into a vehicle that provides a measure
of protection for those whose rights are not bolstered by wealth,
power, and property.
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